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ARTICLES
THE ENRON TRIAL DRAMA:
A NEW CASE FOR STAKEHOLDER THEORY
Russell Powell*

This much in his defence
I needs must add, he ne'er himself denied
Nor bade me hide itfrom thee. It was I,
Fearingto wound thee, lady, I who sinned,
If such concealment should be deemed a sin.
(Lichas, the servant of Heracles, admits that he lied to cover the misdeeds of his
master.)
From the Trachiniae by Sophocles'
I. INTRODUCTION

E

NRON'S downfall is the greatest tragedy in corporate history. Its decline,
bankruptcy, and trials have made the name Enron iconic of corporate

* Assistant Professor at Seattle University School of Law. I would like to thank Dana Gold,
the director of the Center on Corporations, Law and Society at Seattle University School of Law,
for graciously offering to read a draft of this article and for suggesting a range of helpful and
insightful comments. Thanks also to Eric Chiappinelli, Joseph Morrissey, and Ron Lundeen for
their insights and suggestions. Finally, special thanks to my research assistants Hozaifa Cassubhai,
Jeffrey Farrah, and Christopher Smith.
1. 2 SOPHOCLES, AJAX; ELECTRA; TRACHINIAE; PHILOCTETEs 297 (T.E. Page et al. eds., F.
Storr trans., 1961). In the Trachiniae, Sophocles casts the great hero, Heracles, in a negative light.
The story begins with Heracles' wife Deianira distraught over her husband's absence. She hears
that he has been victorious in laying siege to a city. Lichas, Heracles' servant, gives Deianira a
false story of why Heracles attacked the city, but Deianira learns that Heracles attacked the city for
the love of another woman. Distraught by Heracles' infidelity, she decides to trick him. Years
earlier, she had been carried across a river by the centaur, Nessus. He made advances, so Heracles
shot him with an arrow. As he died, he told Deianira that his blood would keep Heracles from
loving any other woman. She creates a robe with the blood and has Lichas send it to Heracles. Her
son then arrives to inform her that Heracles lies dying because her gift turned to acid (a property of
Nessus' blood). Deianira kills herself because she never intended to harm her husband. The dying
Heracles is carried home in horrible pain and furious at his wife's betrayal. His son, Hyllus,
explains the truth, and Heracles realizes that prophesies of his death have come to pass. He was to
be killed by someone who was already dead-Nessus. Heracles begs his son to kill him, and the
play concludes with Heracles being carried off to be burned alive. Id.
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hubris. The criminal trial of Kenneth Lay, Enron's former chairman and CEO,
and Jeffrey Skilling, Enron's former CEO and COO, played as classical Greek
theater for the American public. Although it was not televised, it drew interest
comparable to the O.J. Simpson trial on news sites and blogs.2 The most active
cyber community was the up-to-the-minute reporting on the Houston Chronicle's
website 3 and its Enron: TrialWatch blog, which garnered a devoted following in
both legal and business communities. 4 As a corporate law professor, Enron:
TrialWatch became part of my daily reading regimen. Although I had a
legitimate professional interest in the process and outcome of the trial, the plot
twists, haughty wit, appeals to divinity, and the claims of remorse for harm
caused to thousands transformed the event into a drama that could have been
written by Sophocles.
The trial was a federal criminal prosecution including charges of conspiracy,
securities fraud, wire fraud, false statements, and insider trading.5 On May 25,
2006, the jury found both Skilling and Lay guilty. 6 The vigorous prosecution
made it clear that federal prosecutors fully intended to hold senior managers
accountable for white collar crime. Prior to the Enron failure, it was common for
middle managers to be convicted on securities fraud charges while powerful
CEOs avoided prosecution or received lighter sentences.7 The importance of this
trial and verdict for securities law enforcement is clear. However, the verdicts
also have significant implications for state corporate law regimes and notions of
fiduciary duty.

2. See, e.g., Lauren Steffy, Trials ...
and Errors, http://blogs.chron.com/lorensteffy/2006/01/

(Jan. 30, 2006, 07:43 CST) ("They started lining up at 6:30-that's p.m., as in Sunday night. My
former colleagues at Bloomberg were first in line, of course, at the head of the media circus.
Others trickled in throughout the night.").
3. Enron Corp.-News, Trials and the History of the Scandals, Chron.com-Houston
Chronicle, http://www.chron.com/news/specials/enron/ (last visited May 7, 2007).
4. Enron: TrialWatch: Blogging the Trial of Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling with the Houston
Chronicle Staff, http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/ (last visited May 7, 2007).
5. See Superseding Indictment at 17-36, United States v. Skilling, Cr. No. H-04-25, 2004 WL
322361 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2004).
6. John R. Emshwiller et al., Lay, Skilling Are Convicted of Fraud, WALL ST. J., May 26,
2006, at Al.
7. John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud,and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor'sPerspective,
76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 110-11 (2005).
In the Enron case, the prospect of criminal prosecution clearly failed to provide any
deterrence whatsoever. I expect this was because prosecuting and punishing white collar
crime has never been a priority in the United States. Historically, white collar fraud has been
punished less severely than so-called "blue collar" theft and property destruction cases
causing equivalent economic loss to victims.... This light-handed approach to sentencing in
white collar cases can be seen in the sentences imposed in the major white collar cases of the
late 1980s.
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Many commentators predicted that Lay and Skilling would ultimately be found
guilty, 8 although both men seemed to evoke sympathy in jury members at critical
junctures during the trial. 9 Particularly with regard to the charges involving
complex deal structures and accounting, the criminality of the CEOs'
participation was not self-evident to the jurors.' 0 Numerous legal articles and
books have attempted to describe abuses of mark-to-market accounting, special
purpose entities, loss concealing, and approved self-dealing transactions, all of
which contributed to the downfall of Enron, which resulted in massive layoffs,
eviscerated pension funds, and billions of dollars of market loss.'l A priori, it
8. Kent Schaffer, a Houston criminal defense attorney, called the prosecution a "thorough and
understandable job," predicting that "[i]f a part of the jury wants to convict, they have enough with
what the government gave them." Mary Flood, Enron Verdict Hinges on Lay, Skilling Testimony,
Experts Say, HOUSTON CHRON., May 8, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/
story.mpl/front/3849499.html. Similarly, Joel Androphy, another Houston defense attorney, felt
that the defense "theme that Enron fell because of market forces ... didn't work" and "seemed
faulty." Id.
9. Vikas Bajaj & Kyle Whitmire, Enron Jury Unswayed by 'I Didn't Know', N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/26/business/businessspecial3/
26jury.html?pagewanted 2&ei=5088&en=8745aaac319f4da 1&ex = 1306296000&partner-rssnyt&e
mc=rss.
Ms. Vaughan, the entrepreneur, said she wanted to believe the defendants but in the end
could not square their version of events with the evidence and the testimony of other Enron
executives.
"Early during the trial, I had an admiration for both men-just what they had accomplished
in their careers," she said. "And it was sad to see that in the end it wasn't accomplished in a
respectful manner, having to hurt so many people to get there."
Id. See also Editorial, Lay, Skilling Guilty On Nearly All Counts, MSNBC NEWS SERV.,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12968481/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2007) ("'I wanted very, very badly
to believe what they were saying, very much so,' juror Wendy Vaughan told reporters after the
verdict.").
10. See Christopher Palmeri, Guilty Verdicts for Enron Brass, Bus. WK. ONLINE, May 25,
2006, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/may2006/pi20060525_754989.htm ("It took
an awful lot to convince some of us."); Enron Jury Finally Speaks Out, HOUSTON CHRON., May 26,
2006, at Al, available at http://chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/3894458.html ("Another juror,
Wendy Vaughan, the owner of two local companies, said she wanted to believe both Lay and
Skilling at the outset of the trial. But that changed."); Bajaj & Whitmire, supra note 9:
The jurors said they vacillated during the trial as prosecutors and defense lawyers offered
competing explanations of the events going on at the company.
"Through 16 weeks of testimony, I would go home one night swayed in one direction,"
Mr. Baggett said. "The next day, when cross or direct began, it would go the other direction.
And I think we all felt that-you felt like a Ping-Pong ball."
Id.
11. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modern Business Corporation:Some InitialReflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1234-35 (2002):
We have come to rely on a particular set of assumptions about the connection between stock
market prices and underlying economic realities; the reliability of independent auditors,
financial standards, and copious disclosure in protecting the integrity of financial reporting;
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was not entirely clear that Lay and Skilling's knowledge and participation in
these mechanisms rose to the level of criminal culpability.
After the
announcement of the verdict, a number of jury members made public statements
indicating that they struggled to understand the complexity of Enron's missteps,
but that the degree of harm to employees and the community influenced their
decision to convict.' 2
To the extent that this phenomenon provides a
the efficacy of corporate governance in monitoring managerial performance; the utility of
stock options in aligning managerial and shareholder interests, and the value of employee
ownership as both an incentive device as well as a retirement planning tool.
Id.See also John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron: A Capsule Social and Economic History of
the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 280 (2004) ("Nonetheless, here as elsewhere, logic and
experience conflict: Despite the seemingly clear logic of the gatekeeper rationale, experience
during the 1990s suggests that professional gatekeepers will acquiesce in managerial fraud, even
though the apparent reputational losses would seem to dwarf the gains to be made from an
individual client."); Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and
Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 407 (2004) ("[T]he market for corporate control depends on
efficiency in the capital markets, but if share prices do not reflect managers' actual performance,
the market for corporate control cannot effectively discipline corporate management."); Lyman
Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in CorporateLaw, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27,
52 (2003) ("In the contractarian view, for Enron directors and officers to be loyal to Enron as a
company is ludicrous."); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1315 (2002) ("When it capitalized the LJM-related Raptor I-IV SPEs, Enron
booked the notes issued by the SPEs as assets on its balance sheet and increased its shareholders'
equity in a like amount, as one would do when selling newly issued common stock for cash in a
public offering."); Donald C. Langevoort, The OrganizationalPsychology of Hyper-Competition:
CorporateIrresponsibilityand the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 973 (2002) ("I
fear that near-term stock-price obsession in aggressive knowledge-based organizations is naturally
embedded, and not easily overcome."); ENRON CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, at xi
(Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004):
"Enron" connotes extreme greed and extreme cunning. It connotes a corporate culture run
amok, relying on corporate cronyism to support heretofore unsupportable business deals. The
key players were larger than life, and their collective fall from grace was cushioned by
millions of dollars in salaries, bonuses, and stock options. The story of Enron is still being
written.
Id.
12. See Appendix for a detailed breakdown of the nature of juror comments. See also
Emshwiller et al., supra note 6; Enron Jury Finally Speaks Out, supra note 10 ("One female juror,
speaking after the verdicts were returned, said the jury 'felt the pain and loss of every employee' of
the defunct company, once the nation's seventh-largest.); Nick Cohen, Yet Again We Cave Into
Religious Bigots. And This Time They're Hindus, THE OBSERVER, May 28, 2006, at 11 ("Guilty in
the eyes of man and God"), available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/
0,, 1784662,00.html:
Last week, it wasn't God, but a Texan jury which passed judgment on Lay, finding him
guilty of fraud after the collapse of Enron with the loss of all jobs in one of the biggest scams
in history. Carolyn Kuchera, a payroll manager, said she and other jurors with managerial
responsibilities were used to going home at night "so tired we hardly knew who we were."
They "were always accountable" for their treatment of subordinates and she thought that the
employees at Enron were entitled to "the same thing" from Lay. They didn't get it, which is
why he is going to jail.
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generalizable example of jury behavior, it raises new questions about corporate
governance practices and corporate fiduciary duties.
This article argues that if juries (or judges) are influenced by the magnitude of
harm caused by fraudulent, disloyal behavior, especially when it impacts large
numbers of working and middle-class employees, it is likely that the same factors
will impact the outcome of derivative suits claiming breaches in fiduciary duties
brought against officers and perhaps even directors. If concern for employees
and communities plays a role in deliberation of federal fraud charges, it may play
a role in civil fiduciary duty suits even when the only factual questions concern
duties owed to shareholders. Officers and directors who want to avoid personal
liability for alleged duty violations may choose to consider impacts on corporate
stakeholders, especially employees. This appears consistent with stakeholder and
related models of corporate governance advocating that corporate fiduciaries
should be able to consider the
3 interests of stakeholders other than shareholders in
making business decisions.
Section II briefly outlines the tragic fall of Enron. Section III recounts
significant highlights from the Lay-Skilling trial. Section IV analyzes reported
statements made by jury members between May 25 and July 10, 2006. Section V
uses this analysis to advocate the need for a stronger emphasis on stakeholder
theory.

Id. See also Jurors Reject Testimony, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, May 26, 2006, at Dl ("Jurors said they
wanted their verdict to send a message. Foreman Deborah Smith, who works in human relations for
a large oilfield service company, said the government should look at tightening the rules.");
Palmeri, supra note 10 ("'1 hope they change some laws and the SEC (Securities and Exchange
Commission) takes a look so that protections are there for investors,' said Thomas. 'Those in
charge have responsibility. There's a lot of losers in this. Companies must be conscientious in all
the endeavors they carry out."'); Bruce Nichols, Jurors: Defendants' Denials Not Credible, Panel
Unconvinced By Claims That Lay, Skilling Were Unawareof Fraud,DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May
26, 2006, at 17A ('I also hope ...
that this decision will make [all companies] more conscientious,'
said Nancy Thomas ... 'Those in charge have a responsibility. There's a lot of losers in this.
There's too much hurt here."').
13. See generally Kent Greenfield, New Principlesfor CorporateLaw, 1 HASTINGS Bus. L.J.
87 (2005); Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of CorporateIllegality, 87
VA. L. REV. 1279 (2001); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Kellye Y. Testy, What is the "New " CorporateSocial
Responsibility?:Linking Progressive CorporateLaw With ProgressiveSocial Movements, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 1227 (2002); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing
Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993)
[hereinafter O'Connor, Human Capital Era]; Marleen O'Connor, Employees and Corporate
Governance: United States: Labor's Role in American CorporateGovernance Structure, 22 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 97 (2000) [hereinafter O'Connor, Labor'sRole]; STEVEN F. WALKER & JEFFREY
W. MARR, STAKEHOLDER POWER: A WINNING PLAN FOR BUILDING STAKEHOLDER COMMITMENT
AND DRIVING CORPORATE GROWTH (2001); John R. Boatright, What's So Special About
Shareholders?,4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 393 (1994); R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A
STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984); PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY: THE ANATOMY OF THE

INDUSTRIAL ORDER (1950). For a discussion of alternative ethical approaches to governance
questions, see generally Mark A. Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civic Happiness: A Catholic
Critique of Law and Economics, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 35 (2005) and Susan Stabile, A Catholic
Vision of the Corporation,4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 181 (2005).
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II. THE RISE AND FALL OF ENRON

Enron emerged as a leader in natural gas transmission after deregulation of the
industry in the 1980s.14 It rationalized prices by mediating relationships between
producers and consumers.' 5 Under the leadershi6 of Lay, the company gained an
intimate understanding of natural gas markets. 6 Building upon this success,
Enron began a process of diversification in the 1990s.
Many of its new
business opportunities leveraged experience gained in the natural gas industry,
such as energy derivatives, power generation, and retail electricity, including
international projects. Others had few similarities to the core gas business, such
as telecommunicat'on and metals.18 The business press lauded this expansion,
but a number of the new ventures failed to meet expectations, thus eroding the
overall health of the organization. 19 The massive liquefied natural gas plant in
Dabhol, India,2 ° the purchase and sale of Nigerian barges, 2' and the broadband
business are all examples of Enron's colossal business blunders. 22 I remember
representing a competitor in an international project finance bid in the late 1990s.
Enron won the contract with a bid that I could not imagine to be economically
viable. Ultimately, it was not.
In the face of losing investments, company executives found ways to bring in
money that was essentially unreported debt through "pre-pay" transactions.23
Although these transactions provided cash flow, they showed a loss on the
balance sheet. The solution to this problem came in the form of mark-to-market
accounting. In 1992, Enron received Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") R4ermission to use mark-to-market accounting treatment for its core gas
business. This allowed Enron to book unrealized expected earnings for longterm deals immediately. When many of these transactions failed to meet targets,
the company's financial wizards developed the Raptors special purpose entities

14. ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON 31-33 (2002). See
generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELK1ND, THE SMARTEST GuYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING
RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003).
15. See BRYCE, supra note 14, at 54-56.
16. Id.
17. Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at 15-16, In re Enron
Corp, No 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003), available at http://www.enron.com/
corp/por/pdfs/examiner2/InterimReport2ofExaminer.pdf.
18. Id.
19. See BRYCE, supra note 14, at 289 (noting that the company's "international business was a
mess").
20. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 14, at 83.
21. Letter from Leslie R. Caldwell, Director, Enron Task Force, to Robert S. Morvillo &
Charles Stillman, Merrill Lynch Counsel (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/
pr/2003/September/enronagree.pdf.
22. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supranote 14, at xxiv.
23. Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, supra note 17, at 44-45, 58-66.
24. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 14, at 41-42.
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("SPEs") as an accounting hedge against losses. 25 The success of this losscovering mechanism depended on the continued strength of Enron shares that
provided the underlying capital for the SPEs.26 A variation of this strategy
involved the sale of underperforming assets to the LJM funds, which CFO Andy
Fastow conceived, managed, and owned in part, and from which he received
guaranteed returns. 27 Since Enron committed to buying back the assets at a fixed
rate of return, these transactions, which were treated as sales, in fact only
warehoused poor-performing assets. 28 The LJM interested party transactions
made millions for Fastow at the shareholders' expense.29
These and similar strategies for inflating returns and hiding losses (the
"schemes") allowed Enron to grow unabated until 2001.3° Officers, accountants,
attorneys, the board of directors, stock analysts, and even the SEC failed to stop
this cycle before bankruptcy became inevitable. 3' Not surprisingly, Enron
imploded once the schemes came to light in November 2001. It filed for
33
value loss,
bankruptcy on Decembei 2, 2001,32 resulting in a $61 billion share
35

34
the layoff of 4,000 employees, and $1.3 billion in 40 1(k) losses.
Of the many schemes to support Enron's share price, the self-dealing LJM
partnership involving CFO Andy Fastow provides the clearest example of fraud
and breach of the duty of loyalty. Fastow's guilt appeared to be a foregone
conclusion, but extending blame to CEOs Lay and Skilling required an intricate
strategy on the part of federal prosecutors. 3 The schemes to hide losses and
bolster revenues seemed to violate the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
("GAAP") that financial statements reflect economic reality, but Lay and Skilling
insisted that the accounting devices were technically allowed under the rules at
the time, or that in instances involving actual fraud, they were unaware of it.37

25. First Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at 3-4, In re Enron Corp.,
No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2002), available at http://www.enron.com/
corp/por/pdfs/InterimReport 1ofExaminer.pdf.
26. Id.
27. BRYCE, supra note 14, at 223-39. See also Lay-Skilling Trial to Bring Conclusion to Host
of Charges Stemming from Enron Collapse, POWER MKTS. WEEK, Dec. 19, 2005, at 1. Fastow
named the LJM funds using the first initials of his wife and sons. Id
28. Id.
29. The Enron Collapse: Impact to Investors and the FinancialMarkets: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov 't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
107th Cong. 18 (2002) (statement of Rep. Baker, Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.).
30. Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, supra note 17, at 47.
31. Kroger, supranote 7, at 111-12.
32. See Enron Corp.-Timeline of the Rise and Fall of Enron Corp., Chron.com-Houston
Chronicle, http://www.chron.com/news/specials/enron/timeline.html (last visited May 8, 2007).
33. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Riva D. Atlas, Enron's Collapse: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Late
Edition, Dec. 4, 2001, at C1.
34. Kenneth L. Gilpin, Enron's Collapse: The Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Late Edition, Dec. 4,
2001, at C8.
35. Id.
36. Id at 270-76.
37. See Posting of John Roper to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/
archives/2006/04/ (Apr. 24, 2006, 11:34 CST).
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Unfortunately for both Lay and Skilling, the federal government, and eventually
the jury, disagreed.
III. THE TRIAL
Congressional hearings investigating the fall of Enron began in January
2002. 3 ' Federal regulators and prosecutors moved carefully, beginning with
action against Arthur Anderson, Enron's auditor.39 Investigations proceeded, and
a number of strategic indictments were made. 40 The first indictment was on
Halloween in 2002, for Fastow, who became a key government witness in the
Lay-Skilling trial.4 1 Fastow eventually pled guilty in January 2004 and agreed to
assist ongoing investigations in exchange for leniency for his wife, who was also
charged with Enron-related tax fraud.
The government secured much of his
testimony before it brought charges against Skilling and Lay on February 19,
2004, and July 8, 2004, respectively.4 3 Like Fastow, a number of key witnesses,
including Mark Koenig, Ken Rice, Paula Reiker, David Delainey, and Ben
Glisan, Jr. also entered into strategic plea agreements.44 Importantly, Enron's
Chief Accounting Officer Richard Causey, who was charged with securities

38. See The Enron Collapse,supra note 29.
39. Matthew J. Barrett, Enron and Andersen-What Went Wrong and Why Similar Audit
FailuresCould HappenAgain, in ENRON CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note
11, at 155, 156-57.
40. Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron's Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221, 255-57, 270-72 (2004).
41. Indictment at 1, United States v. Fastow, Cr. No. H-02-0665 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2002),
availableat http://fl 1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usfastow 103102ind.pdf.
42. On April 14, 2004, Andrew Fastow pleaded guilty to one charge of conspiracy to commit
wire fraud and one charge of conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud. He agreed to serve
ten years in prison and forfeit up to $23.8 million in assets. Transcript of Rearraignment at 7-14,
United States v. Fastow, Cr. No. H-02-665-S, 2004 WL 3780637 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2004). At the
same time, his wife, Lea Fastow, pleaded guilty to one felony count of filing a false tax report for
failing to report $47,800 in income. United States v. Fastow, 300 F. Supp. 2d 479, 480 (S.D. Tex.
2004) (noting Fastow's plea for filing a false tax return and deferring ruling on Fastow's unopposed
motion to dismiss counts 1-5 of the indictment until after the sentencing hearing). See also Mary
Flood, Fastow to PleadGuilty Today; Feds Now Focus on Skilling, Lay, Houston CHRON., Jan. 14,
2004, at Al.
43. Skilling was named in a thirty-five-count indictment, including wire fraud, securities fraud,
conspiracy, insider trading, and making false statements in financial reports. See Superseding
Indictment, supra note 5. See also Mary Flood, Skilling Indicted, Likely to Surrender/Ex-CEO is
Highest Enron Exec to be Accused, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 19, 2004, at Al. Five months later,
Lay surrendered to the FBI after being indicted on eleven criminal counts of fraud and making
misleading statements. See Superseding Indictment at 18-39, United States v. Causey, No. CR-H04-25 (S-2), 2004 WL 1553217 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2004). See also Mary Flood & Tom Fowler, Lay
Indicted on Federal Charges; The Case: Sealed Document Will Be Unveiled Today; Reaction:
Move is Called 'A Searchfor Scapegoats',HOUSTON CHRON., July 8, 2004, at Al.
44. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Koenig, Cr. No. H-04-389 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2004);
Plea Agreement, United States v. Rice, Cr. No. H-03-0093-04 (S.D. Tex. July 30, 2004); Plea
Agreement, United States v. Rieker, No. CR-H-04-192 (S.D. Tex. May 19, 2004); Plea Agreement,
United States v. Delainey, Cr. No. H-03-420 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2003); Plea Agreement, United
States v. Glisan, Cr. No. H-02-0665 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2003).
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fraud and conspiracy, pled guilty on December 28, 2005. 4 5 This simplified the
overall case against Skilling and Lay and opened up the possibility that Causey
would testify for the prosecution. The4ury was seated on January 30, 2006 and
opening arguments began the next day.
A.

Prosecution Witnesses

The prosecution called a number of former Enron employees to testify against
Lay and Skilling. The first witness it called was Mark Koenig, the former head
of Investor Relations.4 7 Koenig testified that Skilling had misled the public by
portraying Enron's retail division as prospering in order to keep share prices
artificially high.48 Next, Ken Rice, the former head of Enron's broadband
business, took the stand on Valentine's Day. 49 Rice claimed that he repeatedly
misled investors by exaggerating broadband business prospects and that this
practice was expected by senior management. 50 He specifically testified that
Skilling personally made a number of misleading statements to an analyst in a
conference call held on March 23, 2001.51 Paula Reiker, former head of Investor
Relations, secretary to the board of directors, and trustee for the employee
retirement plan, began her testimony February 22, 2006.52 Reiker testified that
she and Lay followed the company practice of misrepresenting the health of the
company in order to inflate share value. 53 The ex-CEO of Enron's retail division,
45. Plea Agreement, United States v. Causey, No. CR-H-04-25(S-2), 2005 WL 3751587 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 28, 2005) (Causey pleaded guilty to one count of securities fraud and accepted a sentence
of five to seven years in prison, and forfeiture of $1.25 million.). See also Simon Romero & Vikas
Bajaj, Enron's Top Accountant Will Help Prosecutors,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2005, at C 1.
46. Alexei Barrionuevo, Enron Jury Chosen in First Day, Setting Stage for Opening
Arguments, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at Cl.
47. Posting of Tom Fowler to Enron: TrialWatch, http:/iblogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/
archives/2006/02/ (Feb. 1, 2006, 08:51 CST).
48. "Jeff Skilling told Wall Street analysts in 2001 that a division of Enron was strong and
growing, despite the fact that the division actually had just lost $200 million in the quarter,"
according to testimony. Posting of John Roper to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/
enrontrialwatch/archives/2006/02/ (Feb. 2, 2006, 10:07 CST).
49. Posting of Mary Flood to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/
archives/2006/02/ (Feb. 27, 2006, 12:37 CST).
50. Major Players in the Enron Trial: Kenneth Rice, Head of Enron 's Broadband Unit, WALL
(last
ST. J. ONLINE, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-enrontrial-0602.html
See also Posting of Tom Fowler to Enron: TrialWatch,
visited May 8, 2007).
http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/archives/2006/02/ (Feb. 16, 2006, 11:32 CST) ("'I knew
that Mr. Skilling and I had misled investors on a number of occasions about the prospects of our
business in EBS,' Rice testified.").
51. Posting of Tom Fowler to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/
archives/2006/02/ (Feb. 14, 2006, 15:12 CST).
52. Posting of John Roper to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/
archives/2006/02/ (Feb. 21, 2006, 08:48 CST).
53. Posting of John Roper to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/
archives/2006/02/ (Feb. 21, 2006, 11:14 CST). At one point, Reiker testified, "[Lay] said, 'Look,
you may not agree with [the secretive shift of the losses], but your job is to deliver the company
message." And she did. Id.
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David Delainey took the stand on March 1, 2006. Delainey claimed that he and
other managers conspired to mislead shareholders by moving losses into units or
entities that avoided reporting them. He admitted to lying and asserted that the
rest of the management team had done the same.54
Fastow began his testimony in early March with the defense's crossexamination on March 13.
Fastow admitted to improperly taking profits related
to self-dealing transactions, but he claimed that these transactions were structured
with the approval of senior management in order to hide losses and bolster
Enron's stock price.5 6
The defense maintained that the Raptor deals, in
particular, were completely legal, notwithstanding Fastow's guilty plea for a
related charge.57 Of all the insider witnesses, Fastow's testimony was the most
problematic and the jurors found it difficult to evaluate his veracity and the
relative weight of his testimony.5 8
Sherron Watkins, the famous whistleblower in the Enron case, took the stand
on March 15, 2006. 59 If there are any heroes in the Enron tragedy, Watkins is
chief among them. She was the whistleblower who took her concerns directly to
Lay in a seven-page e-mail that outlined misallocations of loss and numerous
problems with the Raptor deals. 60 She proposed specific remedies to bring
Enron's accounting statements into compliance with GAAP and SEC disclosure
requirements. 61 Her letter to Lay, dated August 15, 2001, predicted the

54. Posting of Mark Babineck to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/
archives/2006/02/ (Feb. 28, 2006, 11:35 CST). For example, Delainey testified that during an
analyst meeting, "Skilling wanted [him] to avoid calling Enron North America a trading unit. Even
thought that's exactly what it was." Id.
55. Mary Flood & Tom Fowler, The Enron Trial-ObserversSay FastowHeld Up Well On the
Stand/Former CFO Winds Up 4 Days of Testimony and Grueling Questions, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Mar. 14, 2006, at Al.
56. Tom Fowler, Fastow's Testimony May Be Bolstered By Documents Shown/He Guided
Jurors Through Materials Related to Talks He Had With Lay, Skilling, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 12,
2006, at A 10.
57. Id.
58. Mark Babineck, Evidence Buried the Testimony of Lay, Skilling, HOUSTON CHRON., May
26, 2006, at A3, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/enron/3898746.html
("'Fastow was Fastow,' Martin said of the mastermind behind some of Enron's complicated
schemes. 'We knew where he was coming from, we could tell that. We kind of discounted some of
it."').

59. Posting of John Roper to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/
archives/2006/03/ (Mar. 15, 2006, 10:16 CST).
60. Letter from Sherron Watkins to Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay (Aug. 2001), excerpt
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/enron/exhibit/03-15/BBC-0001/Images/98 11.001.PDF.

I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting scandals. My 8 years
of Enron work history will be worth nothing on my resume, the business world will consider
the past successes as nothing but an elaborate accounting hoax. Skilling is resigning now for
'personal reasons' but I think he wasn't having fun, looked down the road and knew this stuff
was unfixable and would rather abandon ship now than resign in shame in 2 years.
Id.
61. Id.
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implosion of the company.62 She met with Lay on August 22 to discuss her
concerns and present a more-detailed account of the problems at Enron.6 3 Lay
acknowledged her concerns and let her know that the company's outside counsel,
Vinson & Elkins, would handle the inquiry.64 Although there is no indication
that Enron's managers took appropriate steps to uncover the alleged fraud,
Watkins later discovered a memo, dated two weeks after her meeting with Lay,
in which Vinson & Elkins confirmed that "Texas law does not currently protect
whistleblowers. 6 5
Finally, Ben Glisan, former Enron treasurer, took the stand on March 21.66
Although he was quite critical of Lay at trial, Glisan never agreed to testify for
the prosecution as part of his plea agreement. 67 Thus, his testimony was less
that Lay knew of
vulnerable to tainting claims by the defense. Glisan testified
68
the fraud in Enron's accounting and disclosure practices.
The testimony of senior Enron officials revealed the complexity of the
questionable practices and transactions. However, the sheer amount of damning
testimony and its relative consistency created the strong impression that Lay and
Skilling were aware of fraud and failed to prevent it. With so many senior
officials testifying, the prosecution did not need to rely exclusively on any single
witness.
B.

Skilling and Lay Testify in Their Defense

Skilling was on the stand from April 10 through April 18.69 Although the jury
reacted coolly to his initial comments, within a day they were laughing at his
jokes.7 ° In his testimony he reviewed the charges against him and refuted them
line by line. He explained the complicated structures used by Enron and
characterized them as perfectly legal. 7' According to observers, the jury seemed
62. Id.
63. Jodie Morse & Amanda Bower, The Party Crasher, TIME, Dec. 22, 2002, at 52, available
at http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/personoftheyear/2002/poywatkins.html.

64. Id.
65. Id. Watkins also describes her loss of access, benefits, and responsibilities after her
meeting with Lay. Id.
66. Posting of John Roper to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/
archives/2006/03/ (Mar. 21, 2006, 15:42 CST).
67. Posting of Tom Fowler to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/
archives/2006/03/ (Mar. 22, 2006, 15:06 CST).
68. Posting of John Roper to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/
archives/2006/03/ (Mar. 22, 2006, 09:19 CST).
69. See Enron Trial Overview, http://accounting.smartpros.com/x51715.xml (last visited May
8, 2007).
70. Mary Flood, Skilling Testifies He Wasn't Aware, Would've Called FBI: Line by Line, ExCEO Details His Objections to Charges, Accusers, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 13, 2006, at Al ("The

12 jurors and four alternates, many of whom seemed to have trouble looking at Skilling when he
first took the stand Monday, are getting more accustomed to him and seemed reasonably engaged
even during the dullest moments Wednesday.").
71. Posting of John Roper to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/
archives/2006/04/ (Apr. 11, 2006, 09:34 CST).
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to warm to him.72 He claimed not to know of Fastow's illegal activity.73 The
prosecution questioned Skilling regarding an investment in his then-girlfriend's
business. 74 While interesting, it had little relevance for the trial. After reviewing
transcripts and reports of his testimony, many readers75of the Enron. TrialWatch
blog wondered whether the prosecution could recover.
Lay's testimony was not as successful as Skilling's. Lay was described as
"testy" and did not appear to build a strong rapport with the jury. 76 He was
steadfast in his claim of innocence. 77 He blamed market speculators, the
financial press, and a handful of corrupt insiders like Fastow for the unfortunate
demise of his beloved company. 78 Lay was neither as charismatic nor as smooth
as Skilling. 79 The strongest portion of his defense was the testimony by
His
respected business and community leaders regarding his character. 80
attempts to control testimony and the lawyers raised questions regarding his

72. See Flood, supra note 70.
73. Posting of John Roper to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/
archives/2006/04/ (Apr. 11, 2006, 07:45 CST).
74. See Posting of Tom Fowler to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/
archives/2006/04/ (Apr. 19, 2006, 15:03 CST).
75. See, e.g., John C. Roper & Tom Fowler, How Did He Do?: Experts Weigh the
Effectiveness of Skilling's Demeanor on the Witness Stand, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 21, 2006, at
Al, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/enron/3809002.html ("Wice and
other defense lawyers believe that because Skilling avoided hitting the canvas, the defense can
chalk it up as a victory in that it could create doubt in the minds of some jurors.").
76. Shaheen Pasha & Jessica Seid, Lay and Skilling's Day of Reckoning: Enron Ex-CEO and
Founder Convicted on Fraud and Conspiracy Charges; Sentencing Slated for September,
25,
2006,
http://money.cnn.com/2006/05/25/news/newsmakers/
May
CNNMoney.Com,
enron verdict/index.htm ("[Wendy Vaughn] added that Lay's demeanor on the stand ultimately
worked against him. 'He seemed very much wanting to be in control,' she said. 'He seemed to have
very much of a chip on his shoulder ... it made me question his character."'); Power Presentations:
The Enron Jurors and General Sun Tzu, May 30, 2006, http://powerpresentations.blogs.com/
my weblog/2006/05/the enronjuror.html ("In an interview following the conviction of Ken Lay
and Jeff Skilling in the Enron corruption trials, Douglas Baggett, one of the jurors, said that the
defendants seemed like 'very controlling people at times ... even telling their attorneys what to
do."').
77. See Pasha & Seid, supra note 76.
78. See Questioning of Ken Lay by Defense Attorney George Secrest, Apr. 24, 2006,
http://images.chron.com/content/news/photos/06/04/24/transcript 0424_skilling 1.pdf.
79. Posting of John Roper to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/enrontrialwatch/
archives/2006/04/ (Apr. 26, 2006, 08:21 CST) ("Just watching Lay on the stand over the last two
days it's obvious he's a man who likes to be in charge. He frequently re-directs the questioning of
his attorneys and reminds them to return to subjects at a later time so they can be more thoroughly
explore."). See also Posting of Kent Shaffer to Enron: TrialWatch, http://blogs.chron.com/legal
commentary/archives/2006/04/in controlout _o.html (Apr. 27, 2006, 15:53 CST) (describing the
differences in style and demeanor between Skilling and Lay on the stand, noting that Lay just might
be "every defense lawyer's worst nightmare").
80. See Frank Ahrens, Lay Finishes Testimony in Enron Trial, WASH. POST ONLINE, May 2,

2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/02/AR200605020062O.html
?nav-rss business.
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capacity to avoid micromanaging and whether
8 1 a compulsive micromanager could
Enron.
at
problems
deep
the
of
unaware
be
The jury deliberated for less than six days and found Lay guilty of all six
counts against him and Skilling guilty of nineteen of the twenty-eight counts
against him. 82 The jury found Skilling not guilty of nine of the ten insider trading
charges and guilty for all of the eighteen remaining charges, including
conspiracy, securities fraud, and false statements. Though Skilling faced up to a
185-year jail sentence, he ultimately received a twenty-four year prison sentence
on October 23, 2006.83 Lay was also found guilty on four counts related to bank
fraud in a parallel bench trial, but he died before sentencing on July 5, 2006.84
81. See Babineck, supra note 58 (quoting Douglas Baggett: "'I saw in both men, very smart,
very brilliant people, but particularly with Skilling, I think he knew that business inside out,' he
said. 'There's no way he didn't know what was going on."'); Bajaj & Whitmire, supra note 9 ("'It
is hard to believe,' said Deborah Smith, the jury forewoman, 'that someone, such a hands-on
individual, could not possibly know the things that were going on within the company."'); Mark
Babinceck & David Kaplan, Enron Jury Guided by Prayer,Evidence, HOUSTON CHRON., May 27,
2006, at A l, availableat http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/enron/3901043.html:
Still, Fernandez said it was interesting watching the defendants spin Enron in a post-Enron
world.
"I just thought they were trying to be controlling and trying to control the trial itself. In my
opinion, I think if they didn't know, they should have found out somehow what was going
on," said Fernandez, who described Lay's sometimes combative nature as "feisty."
Id. Evidence, Testimony Convinced Enron Jurors: Demeanor and Character of Executives
Questioned, MSNBC, May 25, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12978521/.
Vaughan, owner of a roofing contracting company and a fitness concern, said, "I felt like
in the position they were in, it was their duty to know what was going on and they should
have gone farther to know what was going on."
That point was reinforced for Delgado when Skilling stepped off the witness stand and
used a complicated chart to explain for them how Enron set its risk margins for trading
activity.
"To say he was not involved, that's not credible," Delgado said, noting that Skilling was as
proficient in the explanation as the risk expert who testified.
Id. See also Babineck, supra note 58 ('Both defendants said they had their hands firmly on the
wheel,' Delgado said. 'I can't say I don't know what my teachers are doing in the classroom. To say
you didn't know what was going on in your own company was not the right thing."').
82. See Mary Flood, Ex-Enron Bosses Closer to Prison, HOUSTON CHRON., May 26, 2006, at
A 1, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/enron/3898754.html.
83. Tom Fowler, Skilling Gets 24 Years in Prisonfor Enron Fraud, Chron.com-Houston
Chronicle, Oct. 23, 2006, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/specia/enron/4279719.html.
Former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling was sentenced today to 24 years in prison for his role in
the energy company's 2001 collapse in what has become one of the nation's biggest corporate
scandals.
U.S. District Judge Sim Lake ordered Skilling to home confinement with an ankle bracelet
to monitor his movements. He told the U.S. Bureau of Prisons to recommend when Skilling
should report to prison and suggested he be sent to the federal facility in Butner, N.C.
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IV. THE JURORS

After the announcement of the verdict, ten of the twelve jurors disclosed their
identities and made public statements.85 At least one statement has an
anonymous attribution and may have been made by one of the other two jurors.
The ten disclosed jurors include: forewoman Deborah Smith, who works 8in7
human resources;8 6 Douglas Baggett, a manager in Shell Oil's legal department;
Freddy Delgado, an elementary school principal;8 8 Dana Fernandez, a clerk for
Judge Sherman Ross in the Harris County Criminal Court;8 9 Jill Ford, a woman
in her mid-twenties who was a college student in Houston when Enron
collapsed; 90 Kathy Harrison, an elementary school teacher; 9' Carolyn Kuchera, a
payroll manager; 92 Donald Martin, an electrical designer; 93 Nancy Thomas, a
retiree; 94 and Wendy Vaughn, who works in roofing sales and as a personal
fitness trainer.95 This Section analyzes the juror's statements and the factors that
led to Skilling's and Lay's convictions.
A.

Methodology

The basis for this analysis is a review of all public statements made by Enron
jurors between May 25 and July 9, 2006. The initial searches were made on
LexisNexis® and GoogleTM on July 10, 2006. I searched for each juror, looking
for articles or pages containing their names and Enron, and identified ninety
distinct reported statements during this period. Additional hits appeared merely
to reprint previously reported stories. Carolyn Kuchera made the fewest public
statements (two), and Doug Bagget made the most (twenty). The mean number
of statements per disclosed juror is nine. I then organized statements by
substantive topic:
"
*
"
"
*

Respect for defendants;
Bad character of defendants;
Witnesses not coerced;
Defendants knew or should have known;
Verdict based on careful review of the evidence;

Id.
84. See Kurt Eichenwald, An Enron Chapter Closes: The Overview; Enron Founder,Awaiting
Prison,Dies in Colorado, N.Y. TIMEs, July 6, 2006, at Al.
85. See Appendix and discussion infra Section IV.

86. Bajaj & Whitmire, supranote 9.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.; Flood, supra note 82.
Bajaj & Whitmire, supra note 9.
Babineck & Kaplan, supra note 81.
Bajaj & Whitmire, supra note 9.
Id.

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Babineck & Kaplan, supranote 81.
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Witness testimony weighted according to believability;
Very complex finance and accounting issues;
Outcome unclear until the end of deliberation;
Concern for harm to employees and the community; and
Hope that the outcome will act as a deterrent.96

The most common type of statement notes the bad character of Lay, Skilling,
or both.97 This includes references to their greed, controlling nature, and
"disgraceful" conduct. The second most common type of statement indicates
concern for the tremendous harm to innocents: employees, 401(k) holders,
investors, and family members.98 Four statements indicate that attitudes in the
jury shifted throughout the trial and that there was no resolution until the
deliberations.99
B.

Analysis

Two of the most intriguing reactions from the jurors involved concern for
employees and other innocent parties and admission of the complexity of the
issues. Although three jurors repeatedly indicated that their deliberation was
based "only on the facts," at least one of this group (Delgado) also indicated that
he had difficulty understanding the accounting testimony. 00 In total, six jurors
specifically referred either to the complexity of the facts or to the nature and

96. A number of other topics are addressed by the statements, but they are not germane to this
study.
97. See Appendix. See also Bajaj & Whitmire, supra note 9:
The jurors said that they found it appalling that Mr. Lay had mismanaged his own finances
and was selling his own Enron shares even as he assured employees and shareholders that the
company was fiscally sound.
"I thought that was a disgrace," Donald Martin, an electrical designer, said.
A moment later Mr. Delgado echoed that thought. "That was very much the character of
the person that he was. He cashed out before the employees did."
Id. See also Babineck, supra note 58:
The subject of Lay secretly selling millions of dollars worth of Enron stock back to the
company in the waning months seemed to irk jurors, even though they understood it was
legal.
"He just defined the word 'intent' for many of us," said Doug Baggett, 55, citing a key
requirement for a conviction. Electrical designer Don Martin, 66, called Lay's behavior "a
disgrace."
Id.
98. Id. See also sources cited supra note 12.
99. Id. See also sources cited supra note 10.
100. See Appendix. See also sources cited supra notes 10 & 81 and infra note 109 (citing
interview ofjuror Freddy Delgado).
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10 1 Several of these statements seem to represent the views of
magnitude of harm. 02
the jury in general.

1.

Concernfor Employees and Other Innocents

The jurors' statements emphasizing the scope of the harm, the innocence of the
victims, and the special consideration deserved by employees raises a number of
interesting questions. Did the jury consider these factors in reaching a verdict?
Are employees presumed to be owed a special duty by management? Even if the
jury scrupulously obeyed instructions, was it possible for them to not be
influenced by these concerns?
We cannot know for certain whether the scope of harm influenced the outcome
of the trial, but the fact that it is mentioned by jurors at all indicates that it played
some role in their deliberation process even though they never specifically
addressed it in the group. Their statements regarding duties owed to employees
are perhaps more telling. One juror mentioned that, as a manager, she believes
that Lay and Skilling had the same kind of duty to employees that she does:
"[Managers] are always accountable for [the] treatment of subordinates and ...
employees at Enron were entitled to10 3'the same thing' from Lay. They didn't get
it, which is why he is going to jail."'
This is not a fiduciary or other legal duty, but it does imply an assumed
obligation owed to employees, at least in the minds of some jury members. In
determining guilt or innocence, jurors are not allowed to apply their own
standards of conduct or to create duties that do not exist in law. 1 4 However,
recent behavioral research indicates that juries are not always able to ignore the

101. See Appendix. See also sources cited supra notes 10 & 81 and infra note 109 (citing
interview of juror Freddy Delgado).
102. See Enron Jury FinallySpeaks Out, supra note 10.
103. Cohen, supra note 12, at 11.
104. Jury Instructions at 2, United States v. Skilling, Cr. No. H-04-025, (S.D. Tex. May 15,

2006) ("You must not substitute or follow your own notion or opinion as to what the law is or
ought to be. It is your duty to apply the law as I explain it to you, regardless of the consequences....
It is also your duty to base your verdict solely upon the evidence, without prejudice or sympathy.").
For federal model jury instructions, see KEVIN F. O'MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & HON. WILLIAM C.
LEE, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 12.01 (5th ed. 2000):

It is your duty as jurors to follow the law as stated in all of the instructions of the Court and to
apply these rules of law to the facts as you find them to be from the evidence received during
the trial....
Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, it would
be a violation of your sworn duty to base any part of your verdict upon any other view or
opinion of the law than that given in these instructions of the Court just as it would be a
violation of your swom duty ...
to base your verdict upon anything but the evidence received
in the case.... In resolving the issues presented to you for decision in this trial you must not be
persuaded by bias, prejudice, or sympathy for or against any of the parties to this case or by
any public opinion.
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scope of alleged harm and these sorts of informal moral expectations. 0 5 This
bias is not limited to juries; the research also found that judges exhibit the same
degree of bias. 0 6 If these biases are inherent in fact-finding by juries and judges,
perhaps the concerns they address ought to be included in actual legal standards
or at least considered by fiduciaries. In the case of corporate governance and
fraud, this might mean that the interests of employees and communities may
prevail over short-term shareholder wealth maximization concerns. Section IV
further addresses this idea below.
2.

Admission of Complexity

Law and business professors have been writing about Enron's structural and
accounting mechanisms for concealing losses since late 2001.107 There is still
some disagreement among experts as to the legality and appropriateness of some
of these strategies. 0 8 The question of Skilling and Lay's guilt is even more
attenuated. "They were accountants," [juror] Delgado [said], "They mumbled,
and I didn't know anything about what they talked about. Math never was my
best subject. Fortunately, we got to take notes."' 0 9 If these issues were so
complex that jurors did not fully understand them, how did they come to a
verdict? If their statements are any indicator, the number and consistency of
prosecution witnesses, the sheer volume of documentary evidence, the estimation
of the defendants' moral character, and the magnitude of the harm all played a
role." 0 So, although corporate managers may attempt to skirt the edges of
legality, juries may ultimately hold them accountable using different criteria than
the black letter law."'
V.

STAKEHOLDER THEORY

Stakeholder theory departs from the traditional corporate governance theory of
shareholder primacy. Advocates of the stakeholder theory suggest that corporate
managers should consider interested stakeholders in corporate decision-making,
including employees, shareholders, customers, the local communities, and
governments.
I use the term "stakeholder theory" very broadly so as to include
105. See Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty
of DeliberatelyDisregarding,153 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1270-76 (2005).
106. Id.at 1323-24.
107. See generally sources cited supra note 11.
108. See, e.g., Lessons Learned From Enron's Collapse: Auditing the Accounting Industry,
Hearing Before H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 87-96 (2002) (statement of Bala

G. Dharan).
109. Alan Turner, Enron Juror Learns to 'Be Truthful': He Warns a Class Not to Become
Corrupt Working in Corporate U.S., HOUSTON CHRON., June 10, 2006, at B1, available at

http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/enron/3955823.html.
110. See Appendix.
111. See generally Wistrich et al., supra note 105.
112. Michael Jensen, Value Maximization and Shareholder Theory, HARV. Bus. SCH. WORKING
KNOWLEDGE, July 24, 2000, http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/l609.html.
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the stakeholder movement of the late 1980s, the team production model,
corporate social responsibility, and some foreign corporate governance regimes,
such as codetermination in Germany and the de facto system in Japan." 3 All of
these models challenge the shareholder primacy standard and allow or require
boards to consider the interests of employees and other groups with a stake in the
enterprise. This Section will begin by describing and critiquing shareholder
exclusivity in historical context and then move on to compare the various
stakeholder theories and their significance in light of the Enron trial.
A.

The PredominantCorporate Governance Model: ShareholderExclusivity

The contractarian model of the corporation proposed by many legal scholars is
sometimes linked to shareholder wealth maximization and the shareholder' 14 (or,
in some cases, director)" 5 primacy model. 1 6 Thus, it may be categorized as a
shareholder exclusivity model. The first part of the model is not terribly
controversial-the separation of ownership and management; shareholders who
are the owners of the firm elect directors who hire professional managers to run
the day-to-day operations of the corporation. The separation of ownership and
control in public companies is said to be acceptable to shareholders because
directors and managers owe shareholders (and no other parties) the fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care, which is related to the second part of the model-the
Proponents of
exclusive obligation to maximize shareholder wealth. 17
shareholder exclusivity argue that if other parties are owed duties, investors will8
be less willing to part with capital because profits might be diverted to others."
The typical hypothetical for illustrating this tension is a plant closing.
Managers could increase the value of the corporation's shares if an
unproductive plant were closed; at the same time, such a closing would displace
workers and disrupt the community in which the corporation is situated. Under
the shareholder primacy norm, managers must close the plant to fulfill their duty
to shareholders, despite the harm to workers and other nonshareholder
communities that such a closure would engender." 19
113. See infra Section V.B. (discussing stakeholder theories).
114. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REv. 833 (2005) (an argument for increased shareholder democracy).
115. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response to Increasing Shareholder Power:
DirectorPrimacy and ShareholderDisempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1735 (2006) (a defense of
director primacy, responding to Bebchuk).
116. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423 (1993). But cf ADOLF A.
BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)
(the foremost authority on the separation between ownership and control in modem corporate
governance). Note that I refer to shareholder primacy in the context of the duty to maximize
shareholder wealth rather then in the context of direct shareholder versus board or management
control.
117. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to IncreaseIts Profits,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33.
118. Id. See also Bainbridge, supranote 116, at 1430-31.
119. Testy, supra note 13, at 1231.
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The iconic case for shareholder exclusivity is the Michigan Supreme Court's
1919 decision in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 20 In that case, the Dodge brothers
brought suit to force distribution of an extraordinary dividend,' 2 1 which Henry
Ford had stopped paying in 1916 in order to raise wages, lower prices, and
expand production facilities.122 According to the court, if Ford had justified his
business decisions as being in the best interest of the shareholders, his decisions
would have stood. 123 However, because Ford admitted on the stand that he
intended to benefit employees and customers rather than shareholders directly,
his actions were cast as eleemosynary and inappropriate. 124 In reality, there were
a number of other competitive, reputational, and tax issues that likely influenced
125
both the decision to withhold dividends and the character of Ford's testimony.
Even so, corporate law textbooks typically note this case as stating the rule of
shareholder primacy, that is that directors and managers have a duty to maximize
returns for shareholders alone and127may not consider other interests.126 In reality,
this is not the rule in most states.
The contractarian model is powerful in both its descriptive and predictive
capacities from a certain point of view. However, shareholder exclusivity in
particular presumes a significant level of development, such as reasonably
efficient markets and sophisticated infrastructures, and stability, such as reliable
means of legal enforcement for contracts and fiduciary duties. Major fraud and
business failures over the past five years have demonstrated the difficulty of
holding managers accountable to shareholders even with sophisticated corporate
laws and securities regulations.
In contrast to the American shareholder exclusivity model, we see the
interconnectedness of corporations, labor, governments, communities, banks, and
other parties in countries attempting to promote democratic and market
institutions. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and Russia it becomes clear that the ability of
passive investors to earn returns on equity investments depends on the level of
development and stability of local communities.' 28 To that extent, passive
investors might be willing to transfer rents to the state, employees, creditors, and
others who are able to create a climate that makes positive passive investment
returns possible. Viewing this situation exclusively from the point of view of
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
Id. at 668-69.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 683-85.
Id.
See generally GARY J. MILLER,

HIERARCHY

MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF

65-71 (1992).

126. See, e.g.,

WILLIAM

A.

KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON

AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND CORPORATIONS 276 (5th ed. 2003); DANIEL Q. POSIN, CASES AND
ANALYSES ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTITIES: A SOCRATIC APPROACH

264 (2005).
127. Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears,

1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 92-94.
128. See Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why
Importing U.S. CorporateLaw Isn't The Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1067-68 (2004).
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investors in sophisticated markets like the United States discounts the role of
other economic actors who make passive investment reasonably secure.
Infrastructure degradation, environmental harm, labor unrest, social unrest,
consumer fear, and other factors outside of the control of shareholders or
managers could conspire to erode the underlying development and stability that
make complex capital markets successful. Lest critics dismiss this view as nayve,
note that successful economies, such as those in Germany, the United Kingdom,
and Japan, all acknowledge a more substantial role for employees in corporate
governance 129
than is allowed by shareholder exclusivity or most U.S.

jurisdictions.

B.

American Stakeholder Theories

The approaches scholars have previously lumped together as stakeholder
theories have roots in early scholarship that incorporated a communitarian ethic
into the analysis of corporate decision-making.130 These arguments have
resurfaced periodically in various forms.
Corporate social responsibility
scholarship in the 1970s advocated a stricter regulatory response.' 3' Stakeholder
theory came in vogue in the late 1980s as managers sought ways to frustrate
hostile takeovers.
According to the shareholder exclusivity model, directors
and managers should not prevent these transactions if they are in the best interest
of the shareholders, 33 even when takeovers result in officer layoffs and manager
interests conflict with shareholder interests. 134 The stakeholder theory of the
1980s provided managers with a justification for considering interests other than
those of shareholders, particularly in the takeover context.' 35 This particular
manifestation was not necessarily progressive, but it did result in legal reform
that could establish a basis for more progressive change.
Currently, the weak form of basic stakeholder theory is that managers and
directors ought to be allowed to consider interests other than shareholder wealth
maximization. This is the rule in most states today.' 36 By contrast, the strong
form of basic stakeholder theory requires that directors and managers consider
the interests of competing stakeholders. This form necessitates a clear definition
of whose interests must be considered
and in what context. The only state that
137
has adopted this rule is Connecticut.

129. See, e.g., O'Connor, Labor'sRole, supra note 13.
130. See generally DRUCKER, supra note 13.

131. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
132. Springer, supranote 127, at 92-94.
133. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 887, 944-45 (2002).
134. Id.
135. Springer, supra note 127, at 92-94.
136. Id. at 94-96.
137. Id. at 101.
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Scholars Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout advocate a more coherent and
rigorous expression of this view, and have proposed the so-called Team
Production Model.138
In this model, managers, shareholders, employees,
creditors, and local communities act as a team. 1 9 Directors act as independent
mediators and apportion rents to the various participants.140 This approach
acknowledges the interdependence of the participants and proposes to be more
efficient in the allocation of retums.141
Finally, contemporary corporate social responsibility scholarship attempts to
quantify social costs more broadly by considering environmental and political
concerns as well as the interests of traditional stakeholders. 142 This body of work
incorporates a number of critical lenses for evaluating corporate theory and
practice, including critical race theory, feminist jurisprudence, and
environmentalism.' 4 ' The advantage of this approach is that it is holistic, but the
breadth of its scope makes evaluating competing interests a challenging task.
C.

The Role of StakeholderInterests in Foreign CorporateGovernance
Structures

Considering the interests of groups other than shareholders is not merely
theoretical. A number of countries require that boards address the concerns of
employees.
Shareholder-owned corporations in Germany, known as
144
Aktiengesellschafts or AGs, use a structure referred to as codetermination.
Essentially, this guarantees that employees--either directly or through labor
organizations-have board representation. 145 In very large AGs, such as
Siemens, shareholders elect half of the supervisory board (the equivalent to the
American corporate board of directors). 46 Employees and unions elect the other
half.147 Thus, directors have an obligation to their electoral constituencies that
avoids complicated competing fiduciary duties. 148 However, this sort of major
structural change would be difficult in American corporations without some
138. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 13.
139. Id. at 250-53.
140. Id. at 270-79.
141.

Id.

142. Testy, supra note 13, at 1238.
143. Id. at 1248-51.
144. Mark J. Roe, German Codeterminationand German Securities Markets, 5 COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 199, 199-200 (1999) (arguing that codetermination has created problems in boardroom dynamics
and has negatively impacted securities markets in Germany). See also O'Connor, Labor's Role,
supra note 13, at 102-03 (arguing that elements of codetermination provide a helpful contrast for
analyzing corporate governance in the United States); Dieter Sadowski et al., Employees and
Corporate Governance: Germany: The German Model of Corporate and Labor Governance, 22
COMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 33, 36-40 (2000) (explaining the legal framework of the German
codetermination system).
145. Sadowski et al., supra note 144, at 37.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Franck Chantayan, An Examination of American and German CorporateLaw Norms, 16
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 431, 444-45 (2002).
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compensation for existing shareholders who would sacrifice a percentage of
control.
In addition, large Japanese corporations use what Marleen O'Connor refers to
as a Neutral Referee Model, 149 in which corporate boards consider the competing
interests of shareholders and employees. 50 Long-term stability and profitability
may require that employee interests trump short-term wealth maximization
gains.' 5' The challenge of adopting such a system in the United States would be
to define a clear test for balancing these interests.
China is also an interesting example. Large Chinese corporations have been
growing so fast that there is tremendous demand for shares. 1 2 Limits on foreign
ownership have magnified this phenomenon. 53
As a practical matter,
shareholders in Chinese corporations have few mechanisms for holding
management accountable for maximizing returns. 54 Managers tend to be
beholden to government interests, which value factors such as the needs of local
industry, export volume, and full employment. 1 5 As the Chinese economy
continues to expand, its model for governance is likely to play a more significant
role internationally.
So, both theory and competing practice provide potential alternatives to
shareholder exclusivity, especially with regard to concern for employee interests.
This is reinforced by research indicating that permissive stakeholder statutes in

149. O'Connor, Labor's Role, supra note 13, at 107-11. See also Takashi Araki, A
ComparativeAnalysis: Corporate Governance and Labor and Employment Relations in Japan, 22
CoM. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 67 (2000).
150. O'Connor, Labor's Role, supra note 13, at 108 ("Rather than provide direct representation
on the board as under the German system, directors' fiduciary obligations would be altered so that
directors would have the duty to balance the competing considerations of workers and shareholders
in an equitable manner.").
151. See Araki, supra note 149, at 67-68.
152. See Cindy A. Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then and Now,
2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 66-67 ("[T]he traditional enterprise governance regime is not
compatible with the market economy that China is in the midst of developing.").
153. See id at 5-6 (noting the state-ownership model was dominant between the 1950s and
1980s, and was "the only legal form available to provide a safeguard for State property").
154. Id. at 49-50 ("Chinese Corporate Law is silent on the director's duty of care," and does not
have mechanisms in place to monitor directors' performances). See also Guanghua Yu, Using
Western Law to Improve China's State-Owned Enterprises: Of Takeovers and Securities Fraud,39
VAL. U. L. REV. 339, 371-75 (2004) (proposing generally a new framework for public
accountability).
155. Schipani & Liu, supra note 152, at 28-30.
Some government agencies still treat SOE-corporatized corporations like traditional SOEs,
and control them in traditional ways using excessive administrative power. Such control
includes requiring approval of decisions already made by the board of directors, bypassing the
general meeting of shareholders, directly appointing directors and executives and interfering
with daily operations. For example, a survey in early 1999 reveals that "of the enterprises
which are undergoing the reform of establishing a modem enterprise system, officials are still
nominated by government departments instead of the board of directors."
Id. at 29.
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the United States may foster less adversarial relationships56 between management
and labor and may contribute to higher corporate returns.
C.

The Enron Jury and Stakeholders

Jury behavior in the Enron trial seems to prove the exclusive shareholder
wealth maximization standard a fiction. If judges or juries are inclined to
consider, even subconsciously, the scope of harm to innocents, especially
employees, in evaluating criminal liability or breaches of fiduciary duty, it would
behoove managers and directors to consider the impact of their decisions on all
stakeholders within the scope of their legal obligations to shareholders in order to
mitigate the possibility of personal liability. There is a growing body of research
contending that considering the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders
positively contributes to long-term returns and may not ultimately conflict with
shareholder interests. 157 The movement by most states to allow consideration of
interests other than short-term wealth maximization gives directors and managers
flexibility to address the impact of their decisions on the various factors that
make passive capital investment fcasible.158
VI. CONCLUSION

A generation ago, corporate managers and directors had comparatively little
Senior managers convicted of securities fraud tended to
personal liability.
serve light sentences,1 60 and insider boards and authorized self-dealing were more
accepted. Before Smith v. Van Gorkom,16 1 director liability for duty of care
violations was practically nonexistent.' 62 Responses to the historic business
failures at the beginning of the twenty-first century represent a sea change in
public tolerance for unfettered corporate managers whose actions generate
156.

See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND

PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 153-85 (2006).
157. See UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE ASSET MANAGEMENT WORKING GROUP, SHOW ME THE
MONEY: LINKING ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES TO COMPANY VALUE 25

(2006), available at http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/show

me the money.pdf.

See

generally FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTEGRATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT (Oct. 2005),
available at http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/freshfieldslegal resp_20051123.pdf

(commissioned by the UNEP Finance Initiative Asset Management Working Group).
158. For an interesting discussion of corporate constituency statutes, see Brett H. McDonnell,
Corporate Governance and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Corporate Constituency Statutes and
Employee Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2004) ("I ultimately conclude that
while there are some decent arguments for constituency statutes, and they are not as harmful as
many of their opponents feared, they are, all in all, not a good idea. They are a poor substitute for
direct employee involvement in corporate governance.").
159. See Kroger, supra note 7, at 110-11.
160. Id.
161. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
162. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution,
96 Nw. U. L. REV. 489, 507 (2002).
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massive social costs. The convictions of senior officers and directors at Tyco,
Worldcom, Healthsouth, 163 and now Enron reflect this shift. Advocates of
stakeholder theory and corporate social responsibility are now taken more
seriously in boardrooms and legislatures. 164 No single alternative view has
garnered sufficient momentum to challenge the presumption of shareholder
165
exclusivity directly, particularly in important jurisdictions like Delaware.
However, as managers and directors observe that failure to consider the interests
of employees, pension plan participants, and local communities may increase the
likelihood of their liability for bad behavior, the newest proponents of
stakeholder theory and corporate social responsibility may come from surprising
places-CEO suites and corporate boardrooms.
The denouement of the Enron drama continues to play out. The convictions of
Lay and Skilling, like the death of Heracles in the Trachiniae, are both tragic and
anticipated. Like great classical tragedy, hopefully the Enron trial will prompt a
reevaluation of law and ethics that will make future scandals less likely.
Now out ofjoint, a thing of shreds I lie
Baffled by hands invisible, I who claim
A mother of the noblest, andfor sire
The ruler of the starry heavens, Zeus.

163. See Erin McClam, Lay, Skilling Gambled andLost on Stand,WASH. POST ONLINE, May 27,
2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/27/AR200605270049_pf.
html.
164. See Sheila M.J. Bonini et al., When Social Issues Become Strategic, 2 McKINSEY Q.
(2006), availableat http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/articlepage.aspx?ar= 1763&L2=21:
[A]n overwhelming majority of the respondents acknowledged a wider role for corporations
than just maximizing investor returns, though this finding is remarkable in itself. More
striking still is the way participants in our online poll saw environmental concerns, the
offshoring debate, data protection, and other sensitive matters as potential threats to the
creation of value and frankly conceded that their companies handled these issues poorly.
Id. See also Bob Felton, PowerPoint Presentation for the Third Annual Directors Training
Academy at Seattle University School of Law: Directors Call for an Increasingly Active Role in
Value-Added Governance (June 10, 2005) (on file with author) (summarizing the importance of
addressing issues other than short term performance goals). But cf Milton Friedman, Social
Responsibility: 'Fundamentally Subversive'?, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Aug. 15, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_33/b3947115_mz017.htm.
[T]he secret to successful companies is it [sic] gets its workers to be productive. How does a
company pay its workers? It has cash payments. But it has all sorts of add-ons like medical
care.
Is it doing that for social responsibility? No, of course not. But because the government
treats medical care as tax-exempt when it is provided by the employer, it is in the self interest
of the company and the employee to have the employer provide it. That's not a social
responsibility. That's simply providing something the employees like that makes the job more
attractive to them.
Id.
165. Testy, supra note 13, at 1231.
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But of one thing be sure, though I am naught
And cannot stir a step, yet even thus
I am a matchfor her who wrought my woe
Let her but come that she may learn of me
This lesson to repeat to all, that I
Living anddying chastened all that's vile.
uses his own just punishment as a warning for others to avoid his
(Heracles
66
error.)1

166. 2 SOPHOCLES, supra note 1, at 345.
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